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Ann Markusen

Better Deals for State
and Local Economic
Development
This article highlights some key issues
discussed in the author’s new book, Reining
in the Competition for Capital, which is
available now from the Upjohn Institute. Read
the first chapter at http://www.upjohninstitute
.org.

I

n early 2007, North Carolina “won”
a $600 million Google server farm at
a cost of around $260 million in tax
abatements and grants by the state, the
city of Lenoir, and Caldwell County. The
city and county forgave 100 percent of
Google’s business property taxes and
80 percent of its real estate taxes for
three decades, even though Google will
create only 210 jobs, many of which
require advanced degrees that only a
fraction of current residents possess. In

Effective economic development
requires strenuous reforms
to produce good, long-term jobs
and improve efficiency
and equity in the process.
negotiating the deal, Google demanded
that lawmakers keep its name secret from
the public, even from residents who were
asked to sell their homes and properties
for the project.
This case is typical of heightened
global incentive competition in which
companies face off against state and
local governments in a “market for
jobs.” Increasingly, state governors and
local mayors in countries as diverse as
Australia, Brazil, and India are being
pressed for similarly large grants and
tax breaks under conditions of minimal
transparency and where governments
lack expertise to make good deals.
And in large metro areas, similarly
huge sums are bid to influence where
low-wage retailers like Wal-Mart and
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Cabela’s locate, with no net benefit to
the region and negative consequences for
existing smaller retailers.
Are incentives good, bad, or a mixed
bag, and how do we know? In Reining
in the Competition for Capital, top U.S.
scholars and practitioners working on this
issue explore the reasoning, evidence,
and practice under incentive competition.
Though working from disparate
disciplines and points of view, all oppose
either banning incentives altogether
or continuing with the status quo.
Rather, we argue, effective economic
development requires strenuous reforms
to produce good, long-term jobs and
improve efficiency and equity in the
process.
The Reasoning
There are three schools of thought
regarding incentive competition. One
school, stated succinctly by Burstein and
Rolnick (1995), argues that incentives
are both inefficient (they transfer
consumer surplus to firms that would
locate there anyway and interfere with
optimal siting) and inequitable (they
impose tax and public service burdens
on existing firms and residents). This
camp proposes that Congress tax away
all such incentives, rendering them
ineffective. Another school, an analogue
to the famous Tiebout hypothesis about
fiscal competition among fragmented
local governments, argues that the status
quo is efficient and should be left as is.1
The intricate logic of these positions is
explored in the Markusen and Nesse and
Thomas chapters of the book.
A third school of thought argues that
in an integrating world economy where
central governments are devolving
responsibility for economic development

Available now from the
W.E. Upjohn Institute:

Reining in the
Competition
for Capital
Ann Markusen, Editor
Chapter 1: Ann Markusen and
Katherine Nesse, “Institutional
and Political Determinants of
Incentive Competition”
Chapter 2: Kenneth P. Thomas,
“The Sources and Processes of
Tax and Subsidy Competition”
Chapter 3: Peter Fisher,
“The Fiscal Consequences of
Competition for Capital”
Chapter 4: Adinda Sinnaeve,
“How the EU Manages Subsidy
Competition”
Chapter 5: Timothy J. Bartik,
“Solving the Problems of
Economic Development
Incentives”
Chapter 6: Rachel Weber,
“Negotiating the Ideal Deal:
Which Local Governments Have
the Most Bargaining Leverage?”
Chapter 7: William Schweke,
“Do Better Job Creation
Subsidies Hold Real Promise for
Business Incentive Reformers?”
Chapter 8: Greg LeRoy,
“Nine Concrete Ways to Curtail
the Economic War among the
States”

Employment Research

APRIL 2007

sector revenues and often impoverishes
“winning” local governments’ future
operating budgets, especially if firms fail
or decamp in a short time for even lowercost locations.

cost of nearly $40,000 per job (Luger
and Bae 2005; Schweke chapter). In a
pioneering study of 366 Ohio expansions
between 1993 and 1995, Gabe and
Graybill (2002) find that those receiving
incentives overannounced employment
targets but created no new jobs (in fact,
reduced overall jobs), while those that
did not receive incentives accurately
forecast their job expansion and did
create new jobs. Studying the extent to
which incentives create jobs for existing
residents, Bartik (1993) finds that in the
long run, about 80 percent of new jobs in
local economies go to outsiders.
The corporate income tax share of
state revenues, Fisher’s chapter shows,
has dropped by 40 percent between 1980
and recent years (Figure 1), an erosion
he attributes largely to rising incentives
and related changes in taxation practices
aimed at competitiveness. As a result, a
larger share of the public sector service
burden, including that provided to firms, is
borne by households in the form of sales
and property taxes. Since these are highly
regressive taxes, the net result is to shift
the tax burden from the highest income
households to the lowest (Table 1).

The Evidence

Reforming the Market for Jobs

There are few long-term studies or
data with which to evaluate promised
jobs and tax base increments envisioned
in deals of the past, but hard-hitting
analyses are emerging. A path-breaking
analysis of a recent North Carolina
economic development initiative
involving more than $1 billion in public
sector liabilities found that only 4
percent of the jobs created were actually
induced by the program at an exorbitant

The authors document many
encouraging experiments for improving
incentive competition currently in place
as well as reform proposals for federal,
state, and local levels. Sinnaeve, a top
regulator of incentive competition at the
European Commission, explains lucidly
how the EU system of deterrence works.
EU members are prohibited from giving
incentives to firms except under certain
circumstances and only then if they

Figure 1 Corporate Income Tax as a Percent of Total State Tax Revenue, 1975–2005
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(1992, p. 120); data for 1991–2005 from U.S. Census Bureau (2006).

onto lower-level governments, often
without the resources to do so effectively,
we have no choice but to champion state
and local governments’ rights to shape
their relatively open economies. Bartik,
in his chapter, argues that increasing local
employment can yield substantial net
social benefits, especially if jobs go to
existing local residents, if costs of serving
incentivized businesses is less than the
new revenues they generate, and if no
better uses of public resources are on the
horizon.
But the market for jobs and tax
base is rife with failures, the authors
in this collection say. Multilocational
companies, the suppliers of jobs, control
crucial information in the deal-making
process and have greater power in
bilateral negotiations. Through the
remarkable rise of site consultancy as an
intermediating institution, Markusen and
Nesse argue, they are able to informally
collaborate in extracting spending and
tax breaks, while the public sector agents
bidding for jobs are unable or are too
intimidated to share information with
each other. The result is a strong bias
toward overestimating benefits, according
to Bartik. Furthermore, the flurry over
deal making obscures a longer-term
erosion in the business share of public

Table 1 State and Local Taxes as Shares of Family Income

1989
2002
Change (%)

Lowest
20%

Second
20%

10.2
11.4
+1.2

9.4
10.3
+0.8

Middle
20%

Fourth
20%

8.8
9.6
+0.7

8.4
8.8
+0.4

Top
20%
7.5
7.3
−0.1

Top
1%
5.5
5.2
−0.3

NOTE: Tax burdens are shown after the federal offset; that is, these are the net burdens on families
after taking into account the deductibility of state and local taxes on federal returns for those who
itemize (generally higher-income taxpayers).
SOURCE: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2003, pp. 118–119).
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apply to the Commission for permission.
The exceptions involve less-developed
regions, which may offer certain types
of incentives—for training, research, and
technology, for instance—to encourage
new plants and offices. The EU system
largely deters governments from bidding
wars for existing plants, because under
most circumstances, they would simply
not be permitted. While the regulatory
process is expensive, it restrains
tremendous distortions and giveaways
in business sitings worth many times its
cost.
In the United States, many state
and local governments have designed
reporting requirements that raise
transparency in bargaining and awards.
Others have pioneered performance
requirements in written contracts, often
with penalties and repayment provisions.
Weber, in her chapter, explores many of
these and shows how they enable public
sector economic developers, like good
customers in any market, to get a better
deal. She shows that some governments
plan in advance what they want and
are prepared for sudden requests and
bidding wars, invest their public dollars
in place-based assets rather than firmbased ones, and extend benefits only
after firms have produced the jobs they
promise. Clawbacks—requirements that
firms that renege on contracts pay back
some or all of the incentives—and job
quality standards are increasingly being
incorporated into deals, as is school board
input on abatements and tax increment
financing (the devotion of future tax
revenue from increased property values
to paying off bonds for improvements).
Incentive reform is a big and
incremental project at local, state, and
federal levels. Sunshine, claims LeRoy
in his chapter, is the best antiseptic. He
reviews the 12 states that already have
some form of incentive disclosure, a few
of those—Virginia, Maine, and North
Carolina—include corporate income tax
breaks. He also recommends disclosing
state taxes paid to corporate shareholders.
LeRoy argues that the adoption of state
unified development budgets would
enable citizens and decision makers to
see the combination of spending and tax
expenditures involved in all programs,
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as a public interest group in Kentucky
has pioneered for their state (Mountain
Associates for Community Economic
Development 2005). Markusen and Nesse
and LeRoy recommend legally defining
site consultants as lobbyists, blocking
success fees that tend to escalate deal
dollars, and ending dual agency and other
practices that exacerbate market failures.
States can also restrain the
contribution of incentives to sprawl.
To curtail the economic war among the
suburbs for retail, LeRoy recommends
that states ban retail subsidies altogether
except in depressed inner-city markets
that are demonstrably underserved.
The federal government could
considerably moderate incentive
competition by creating federal carrots
against job piracy. LeRoy notes that
federal program funding has been held

To curtail the economic war
among the suburbs for retail,
states could ban retail subsidies
altogether except in depressed
inner-city markets that are
demonstrably underserved.
up to induce states to raise legal drinking
ages and implement school reform. A
share of economic development funding
from the Federal Departments of
Commerce and Labor could be held until
states adopted certain reforms.
Overall, these seminal papers respond
to a growing crisis in state and local
finance, where high-profile recruitments
cost community too much for the jobs
created, or worse, leave them holding
the debt bag when firms fail to perform.
State and local responsibility for
economic development is a growing
reality everywhere in the world, and
incentives are among the most powerful
tools available. Like any market, this one
would benefit from clearer information
and a more level playing field. The
authors in Reining in the Competition for
Capital present models, evidence, and
doable reforms that can help public sector
economic developers accomplish that
within the decade.

Note
1. Tiebout (1956) argues that local governments
in a metropolitan area compete to offer packages
of public services at the best tax “price,” thus
optimally allocating resources when residents “vote
with their feet” in choosing where to live.
Ann Markusen is a professor in the urban and
regional planning graduate program and director of
the Project on Regional and Industrial Economics,
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of
Minnesota.
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